m s La Pampa on trials off Gothenburg 1938

La Pampa was ordered by a Norwegian shipowner, but was bought on the stocks by Buries Markes.   Her early voyages were mainly to South America carrying coal out and grain home - a typical tramp trade. During the first two years of the war she went on a series of different voyages to North America, India, South Africa and Australia, but with similar cargoes.  At 12 knots her speed was somewhat better than most  tramp ships, so she was included in the 'fast' homeward convoys. 

Records still exist for most of the ocean convoys that she joined, but not for the majority of the convoys along the UK coast, the St Lawrence or the India to Persia Gulf run..  She was an unremarkable ship, neither straggling or romping and never making smoke etc so little is recorded about the vessel except occasional mentions that her good signalling, or that her master had acted as commodore for a sub section of an ocean convoy etc.

Outbound in January 1941 she struck an underwater object and had to be drydocked for temporary repairs, after which she joined convoy EN72 carrying the Commodore - she was attacked by an aircraft, but was undamaged.   She then joined the outward convoy OB288.  After the convoy escorts had left, and as the convoy was dispersing, it was attacked by  U-boats, in all ten merchant ships were sunk.   La Pampa the first of a line of five ships, when the bridge watch saw a submarine on the surface.   The submarine was preparing to fire a torpedo at the ship, but the master increased speed and turned to ram the submarine, forcing it to crash dive.   The masters report on the incident was ignored.   For most of the rest of the war, she spent her time hauling aircraft, tanks, landing craft, bridge barges, locomotives and general cargoes. 

There is a great deal more about the later ships of the company on Dave Thomas' website:

http://www.lahaciendaandotherstories.piczo.com

I have  attached the story of the attack on convoy OB288 - sorry about the formatting, as you can see I have a lot to learn!  This report is also on  http://www.warsailors.com,   Mrs Siri Lawson, who is webmistress of this excellent site  has pointed out that most of my convoy links do not work - my apologies to all, I will try to overcome this later I have then listed those convoys and cargoes that are recorded   I have never traced a picture taken of her during the war, nor her cargo book.

The story of OB288

La Pampa was a modern Swedish built motor ship designed for shipping bulk cargoes from Atlantic and Pacific ports to Europe; her bow was strengthened to permit winter ballast passages. She was an open shelter decker with three 60 feet long hatches; one forward of the bridge, one between the bridge and the engine room and one aft. Each hatch was served by two sets of derricks, with a 25 ton jumbo could be rigged to serve No2 hold.. Her three sister ships were under the Norwegian flag. She had a service speed of 12 knots and was equipped to switch to liner trades when the occasion demanded.  In December 1940 La Pampa arrived in Hull with a cargo of grain after a trip across the Atlantic during which storm force winds were encountered. The convoy became scattered and La Pampa was later joined by one of the escorts for the final leg to Loch Ewe. The escort reported the worst weather he had ever encountered – the La Pampa did not submit a damage report.

On the 31st January the La Pampa sailed from the River Tyne, on the English East Coast where she had loaded a part cargo of 2,995 tons of gas coke. The ship was due to steam to the West Coast of Scotland where she was to join the outward bound convoy OB287. Shortly after leaving the vessel struck an underwater object, it is not clear whether this was wreckage- which was in abundance at that time – or the seabed. The ship put back into the Tyne where she drydocked. The damage was described as “set up in way of tanks 1 to 3”, just under half the length of the ship from forward. Because of the enormous pressure on the UK ship repairers it was decided that only temporary repairs would be carried out, after that the vessel would continue on her planned voyage to Baltimore MD where she would again drydocked to complete permanent repairs. The ship was obviously judged to be seaworthy at this point.

On the 11th February La Pampa again sailed from the Tyne, arriving at Loch Ewe on the West Coast on the 13th. On the 15th she sailed from there, with a number of other ships, to join convoy OB288 which had originated in Liverpool. La Pampa was allocated the pennant number 56, which put her in the back row of the convoy about two miles astern of the Commodore’s ship the Sirikishna. A hand written sailing order [convoy formation] for this convoy is available; this may have been modified by the Commodore because there were a couple of gaps in the plan. Further gaps opened up when three ships turned back with mechanical problems; they were the Empire Fusilier, the Empire Steelhead and the Kasonga. Two ships, the Kingston Hill and the Keila, were bombed (these were escorted back to the UK by the corvette HMS Picotee and the Smit tug Thames). Captain Walter Niven the Master of the Kingston Hill was killed in this attack.

By now the convoy was reduced to 41 ships. The other escorts were the destroyers Achates, Antelope, Georgetown (Senior Officer escort), the corvette Heather and the trawler Ayrshire. An “Ocean Boarding Vessel” the Manistee was also with the convoy. Both the Ayrshire and the Manistee were merchant vessels that had been requisitioned by the Admiralty.

At 1623/21 the convoy was ordered to steer 270 after passing 59 44’ N, 09 00’ W to avoid a U-boat. At 0900/22 the escort signalled “HELP” in 59 40’N 12 40’ W because of an air attack. C in C Western Approaches to OB2988 “disperse at dark 23rd when last escort left. At 1900/22 the convoy was plotted as being in 59 20’N 14 32’ W. At 2100/22 a course alteration to 270 was ordered [but not carried out?] and at 0900/23 a further alteration to 300

Despite the fact that the convoy had been attacked by aircraft and the C in C West Approaches knew that it was being shadowed by one or more U-boats, the escorts left the convoy on [the morning of?] the 23rd. From now on the convoy had no defence against submarines. For some reason the Commodore, who was lost in the later attack, kept the convoy in formation, on a north westerly course, until the evening of the 23rd, it was tracked all day by a U-boat [U96?] By then at least six submarines were converging to form a patrol line NW/SE through 59N 21W.

The Commodore ordered the convoy to disperse at 2100 [BST?] that evening - but told the ships to maintain convoy speed for 30 minutes after dispersal - the vessels fanned out on courses between North, through West, to South South East. At this time the weather was fair with a light wind and a moderate North Westerly swell, there was no moon but visibility was recorded as being about seven miles with the northern lights.

What happened next is summarised in the following extract from La Pampa’s log and survivors reports.

LA PAMPA. (4186 tons) Feb 23^rd continued: -

2130     Convoy dispersed. (P. Log 67') [shows distance steamed since Noon]. Set Co(ourse) 237degrees [T] in                         accordance with convoy instructions.

2200     Encountered enemy S/M barrage. S/S MARGALAU torpedoed. Position 59 31' N, 21 02'W. Proceeded at        utmost speed and varied courses accordingly.

2344     Observed enemy S/M at periscope depth close on starboard bow. Manoeuvred ship to ram it and passed immediately over S/M as it dived.  Posn. 59 26' N 21 08' W (Radio [position radiod]). Clocks retarded 1 hour.

            Weather: Smooth sea. Mod. swell. Fine and clear.

WAYNEGATE (4260 tons)

Focke Wolf attack at 0700 22nd - 15 W. In formation to 1900 Sun 23rd dispersed but told to maintain convoy speed for 30 minutes. Swung to SSE [T] with several other ships. W/T message from TEMPLE MOAT "being chased by submarine" [Waynegate says Temple Moat on W's port quarter about 5' away]. 2130 W/T message from LA PAMPA "sighted sub" [Waynegate says La Pampa about 5' away on his starboard quarter]. Altered course due South. Temple Moat still being chased. 24/0220 Course SW [T] in 50 [58 or 59?] 50' N, 21 47' W speed 10.25 knots - torpedoed [elsewhere 0320]. Heavy swell, wind Southerly force 4, squally snow showers visibility variable. In boats for 6 hours, very heavy snow showers. Picked up at 0830 by Free French Ship LEOPOLD. [LEOPARD FFr large destroyer]

HUNTINGDON (10946 tons) [not Auxiliary Cruiser as elsewhere reported]

23/2000 dispersed: 12 knots 200 [T] zigzagging. 0235 in 58 23’ N, 20 23’ W, torpedoed. Picked up by PAPALENOS [Gr.] 24/1130. Whilst onboard [H?] heard SSS from HARBOROUGH [not in convoy Harberton? VC] and MARSLEW. Elsewhere 58 09' N 21 16' W 0309/24, but above also confirmed in ADM199/1179. 

ANGLO PERUVIAN (5457 tons)

Wx NW f3, moderate NW'ly swell cloudy but very clear, visibility 7' + as there were bright Northern Lights. 2100/23 260 [T] x 9 knots in 59 30' N, 21 00' W torpedoed. Those who survived were picked up by HARBERTON [Master Vice Commodore].

The Anglo Peruvian report adds: - "When the attack took place we had no escorts with us for 12 hours and it is noticeable that it is always during a period when we are alone that the U-boat attacks occur. The danger spot seems to be [between?] 18 W and 25 W. OB ----- would be so much better if the Ocean Escorts could meet a convoy when the other escorts leave".

MARSLEW (4542 tons)

2245/23 Torpedoed 59 18' N 21 30' W 291 [from] Rockall 272'

HMS MANISTEE (5360 tons)

Torpedoed 2145/23 58 13’ N 21 33’ W. At 0618/24^th course 093speed 7.5 knots torpedoed again and sunk in 58 55' N 20 50' W. HEATHER, CHURCHILL and LEOPARD proceeded to assist.

TEMPLE MOAT (4427 tons)

Being chased by submarine 59 27' N 20 20'W 2346/23

CAPE NELSON (3807 tons) 2100/23

Overdue ships SVEIN JARL(1908 t), LINARIA(3385 t) & SIRIKISHNA(5458t)

As will be seen above nine merchant ships were lost in this encounter, plus another that had been requisitioned by the Admiralty. In all 246 Allied and Neutral seafarers lost their lives including 192 British merchant seamen, whilst the bulk of these were from the UK others came from as far afield as Canada and Aden.

The extract from the log of the La Pampa was contained in a letter written by the British Consul in Baltimore on the 25^th March, that letter went on to say: -

“Captain Toder is of the opinion that the long score mentioned above was caused by contact with the U-boat, and as he was half loaded with (gas) coke at the time, he probably would not feel this contact - particularly as his ship vibrates a lot when not fully loaded. The U-boat was first seen 200 yards off on the surface (not at periscope depth as stated in the log) about two points on the starboard bow. Engines were immediately put to full speed and helm put over to make for the U-boat, and they machine gunned her from the bridge. The U-boat crash dived, and the ship passed exactly over the spot where the U-boat disappeared and was doing about 13 knots at the time. No number was seen on the conning tower owing to the darkness, but the conning tower was very large”.

The interviewer added, "I attach hereto a sketch showing position of U-boat and ships. It seems to me that the action of the S.S. (sic) La Pampa probably saved the other ships in company from the waiting U-boat".

Submarines active in the area at some time during February: -

Italian: - Barbarigo, Baracca*, Bianchi, Dandola*, Emo, Marcello [sunk 23 Feb 41?] Morosini*, Otaria. [*=Relieved mid Feb by the others listed, before 22/2 if M sunk then] at sea 31/1/41. Italian subs had own base at Bordeaux [BETASOM]

German: - u101, u52, u94, u103, and u37. Attacking convoys in North? - U96, u68, u73, u95, u123, u48 [west of Fastnet 24/2], u107, u70 [sunk by HMS Camelia/Arbutus/Wolverine 8th March SE of Iceland after being rammed and damaged by S.T. Mijdrecht (Du) 7.2.41], u47 sunk by?

La Pampa docked at Baltimore and the repairs undertaken were summarised in Lloyd’s List

New York, March 17. m.v. La Pampa grounding in January:

19 plates renewed, 10 off (?), 22 faired, 90 foot of centre keelson, 64 floors, 54 frames, intercostals, bulkheads & tanktop plates straightened and part renewed, steam clean & test, hold ceiling limbers lifted, part renew, propeller repairs, part renew, shaft drawn, rudder repair, together with sundry damages. Costs at Baltimore, including drydock charges $95,900 – Salvage Association Surveyors.

MV La Pampa finished repairs on Thurs 4/3

The amount of damage repaired in Baltimore seems exceed that reported in the Tyne, which leads one to two possible conclusions, either the Tyne report understated the damage or the La Pampa incurred further damage on the voyage. If the second is true then it would seem that the La Pampa could well have made contact with a submarine during the night 23^rd/24^th.

On the 21^st March a signal was sent to London that reads “FOLLOWING FROM BALTIMORE BEGINS “MASTER BRITISH SHIP “LA PAMPA” IN DRY DOCK REPORTS MARKS ON THE BOTTOM INDICATES ATTEMPT TO RAM U-BOAT WHEN CONVOY (LOCH EWE FEBRUARY 20^TH WAS ATTACKED FEBRUARY 23^RD SHIPS 59 26’ NORTH 21 8’ WEST MAY HAVE BEEN SUCESSFUL, REPORT FOLLOWS”. ENDS.

On the 8th April 1941 the text of the report made by the British Consul in Baltimore was sent to the Director of Naval Intelligence in Whitehall, London. On the day before this Ottawa wrote to F W Bennett in New York “BY SAFE HAND”

“Thanks for your B/379 of 3rd April and letter of 4th April.

I have sent your remarks, along with the Master’s report, to the Admiralty. I am sure they too will agree with your views but I thought it was as well to send the whole correspondence in case the Master starts making more reports when he gets home.”

Bennett’s remarks have not so far been unearthed but, reading the last line of this letter, one can assume that they were dismissive of the Master’s claim.

The German’s claimed to have sunk a large tonnage of allied ships in the week ending the 28th February; the British, still unaware of the full extent of the calamity, dismissed claim. In fact their total losses in that week exceeded 200,000 tons of merchant shipping – mostly from four outward convoys.

In March the British had decoded the German Ultra reports for February and knew that no U-boats had been lost, so they seem to have disregarded the La Pampa’s report. However the Italian submarine R. Smg. Marcello had failed to respond to signals after the 22^nd February and had been posted as missing. Then, and for some years thereafter, the British tried to credit the sinking of the Marcello to various British naval vessels or an aircraft [A Sunderland, HMS Periwinkle, HMS Hurricane & HMS Montgomery]. By 1949 they had been forced to admit that three of their claims were not possible. They therefore informed the Italian authorities that the remaining claim, made on behalf of H.M.S. Montgomery – an old ex American four stacker, must have been the one. The Montgomery’s logbooks could not be traced at the Public Record Office, but a report filed in ADM199/2040 states “1550/22 HMS Montgomery attacked firm contact with six depth charges, there was no evidence of destruction”. There is nothing to connect Montgomery with an attack on the Marcello, and the Montgomery herself makes no claim in that report to have sunk a submarine.

In contrast the Master of the La Pampa is quite specific about the time and position of his attack on a submarine. It will be remembered that he says that “No number was seen on the conning tower owing to the darkness, but the conning tower was very large”. The conning towers of Italian submarines were unusually large and not numbered. The Marcello lacked various important modifications, which meant that she would have taken 65 seconds to dive– sufficient time for the La Pampa to inflict a fatal wound.

But examination of the Kriegstagesbuch for the U-boats involved in action against OB288 gives the following entry for U-69

U69 124.2.41 0039 AL 2365. Heckangriff auf früheres norwegisches Schwergut-Spezialschiff –M.Dv.Nr. 900 Teil ll Nr. 45 Norway- angesetzt.

Während des Anlaufs wurde das Nordlicht so stark, daβ die Wasseroberfläwie von Scheinwerfern tadhell erleuchtet wer. Der Dampfer dreht auf des Boot zu, vermehrt Fahrt und eröffnet auf 400 m das Feuer mit 2 cm-Geschützen. Einschläge rings um das Boot. Durch Alarmtauchen mit “AK” konnte ïdigung des Bootes verhinderen.

0135 Unter Wasser abgeluafen und aufgetaucht.

Three people on the forum@uboat.net have helped with translations a synthesis of them gives

“Commenced stern tube attack on Norwegian heavy lift carrier [M Div 900 is the book “Marine-Dienstvorschriften” part 2 picture 45]. During the approach the Northern Lights intensified, so that the water surface was coloured as if illuminated by searchlights.

The steamer turned towards the boat, increased speed and opened fire with 2 cm guns at 400 meters around the boat. Was only able to avoid damage through emergency dive AK at full speed.

0135 underwater cruised away and surfaced”.

Thus by causing the U-69 to dive La Pampa saved herself and probably one or more of the three ships that were with her.

Jost Metzler [the commander of the U-69 – a former merchant service officer] had his day thoroughly spoilt; he spent about 100 minutes underwater, by which time the La Pampa and her group had disappeared. Next he attacked another ship, which saw the torpedo trail and avoided it [HARBERTON?] and finally he was heavily depth charged.

Then on 25.2.41 he made the following entry in his KTB: -

zum Klar Nachladen. Beim öffnen des Oberdeckbehälters stellt sich heraus, daβ das Schwanzstück des Torpedos volkommen eingedrückt ist, Torpedo unbrauchbar. Bei der Untersuchung des behälters wird festgesttellt, daβ ein Búgel der Deckelverschraubung gebrochen ist und offenbar der Bewasserrungshahn undicht geworden ist. Die Undichtigkeit wird auf Lockeren das Hahnes durch Erschütterung bei Fliegerbomben und Wabo-Angriffen zurückgeführt.

Rückmarsch fortgesetzt.

Considering the reports from the La Pampa and the U69 together it would seem that the score on the bottom of the La Pampa could have been caused by contact with the closing mechanism of the upper deck torpedo hatch on the U69; though it is possible that one of La Pampa's 20mm shells hit it. Bombing and/or depth charging is very unlikely to have caused this damage, had it done so the damage would not have been so localised. It then follows that, not only did the La Pampa’s action save the ship and possibly the others with her, it also prevented the U69 from reloading his torpedoes. This in turn meant that the trip had to be abandoned, maybe saving other ships from destruction.

It is interesting to note that the U-69s logs [and the other U-boat Kriegstagebuch] are stamped “This document is Admiralty Property ---“. So both the La Pampa’s report and the Kriegstagebuch were in the same establishment and should have been available to the post war committee who ploughed through these records in an effort to credit U-boat sinkings to RN ships.

We are left with several questions including who did sink the Marcello, and for that matter the U-47, and were the other attacks by merchant ships ever properly investigated?

Why was the convoy abandoned by the escorts and why were the vessels kept together in formation all day giving the submarines ample time to converge and mount an attack? There was a great deal of chatter from the U-boats that, even though the British could not decode this, would have alerted them to the presence of a pack. In his log the master of the La Pampa refers to encountering an “enemy S/M barrage”.

It is noted that none of the escorts returned to assist the merchant ships when they heard that an attack was taking place – but three the HEATHER, CHURCHILL and LEOPARD were able to return to assist the HMS Manistee when she sank at daybreak. It was presumably these vessels who depth charged U69 and the U96 around midday on the 24^th. Could they have accounted for the MARCELLO also?

Whatever they achieved they were twelve hours too late to help the convoy.